2. Sink or Swim? Conflict and Cooperation in the Eastern Nile Basin

Figure 1 Lake Tana, Ethiopia

'Many of the wars of the 20th century were about oil but wars of the 21st century will be about water unless we change the way in which we manage it’ – Ismail Serageldin. 

In recent decades, there has been a paradigm shift in recognising that ‘water wars’ are not inevitable but in fact, unlikely, in the context of water disputes. This post will use the Eastern Nile Basin to illustrate why it is much more useful to consider water disputes along a scale ranging from extreme conflict to extreme cooperation, and to understand how disputes could be resolved.

The Blue Nile is one of two major tributaries of the river Nile and begins at Lake Tana in Ethiopia, flowing into Sudan to join the White Nile, and then northwards into Egypt. These three countries comprise the Eastern Nile Basin, where tensions have risen due to Ethiopia’s filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 The course of the River Nile and the location of the GERD

For upstream Ethiopia, the dam generates hydropower for 65 million Ethiopians. However, for Egypt, a country which relies on the Nile for over 90% of its water, the dam could reduce water downstream by 1/3 and reduce Egypt’s arable land mass by up to 72%. Similar concerns exist for Sudan, though to a lesser extent. Tensions arising from these competing national interests could escalate into conflict if states such as Egypt and Sudan do not see a benefit to their cooperation.

Does this mean a ‘water war’ is going to break out soon? 

Analyses of the factors which promote, or hinder cooperation suggest that the answer is not straight forward. Indicators found to contribute to conflict most significantly were ‘rapid or extreme changes in physical or institutional settings’, for which the dam would be an example. Furthermore, on their ‘Basins at Risk’ (BAR) scale, Yoffe, Wolf and Giordano (2003) found that the most conflictive disputes were exclusively related to issues of quantity and infrastructure. Here, Egypt’s concerns over the reduction of flow downstream would present a risk for highly conflictive event. 

On the other hand, ‘the presence of institutional mechanisms’ signified an increased likelihood of cooperation, for which the Declaration of Principles in 2015 and several trilateral agreements could be cited. The establishment of international freshwater agreements is classed as highly cooperative because they mitigate uncertainties which increase the propensity for conflict. Furthermore, highly cooperative events often involved ‘multiple country pairs’, with an average of 3 per treaty – boding well for the agreements signed by Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan.

Overall, this case study illustrates that increasing water tensions do not inevitably lead to ‘water wars’ but in fact, a range of conflictive and cooperative events are possible. Cooperation actually occurs in 67% of cases in transboundary river basins and elements of this have been seen between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. This cooperation could be extended further through agreements which reduce uncertainty in the geophysical implications of the GERD as this would allow each riparian state to better perceive the benefits of their cooperation … see next post for more details.